How satisfactory are these answers in philosophical terms?ĩ. State the seven objections against coherentism Walker considers, along with his answers. What’s Walker’s designated set of believes other beliefs must cohere with to be true?Ĩ. What’s Russell’s main objection to coherentism? How does Walker reply to this objection?Ħ. What does the coherence theory consist in?ĥ. What does the correspondence theory consist in?Ĥ. What’s the difference between a theory about the nature of truth, a criterion for truth, the concept of truth, and the meaning of the truth predicate? In which of these categories do correspondentism, coherentism, and deflationism fall?ģ. Some relations (such as identity and difference) are in fact external, and this in itself makes the doctrine of internal.1. Since the many detailed arguments set forth within the work do not lend themselves to a 194 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY brief summary, I shall present some points made in the treatment of the doctrine of internal relations which furnish clues about the philosophical perspective from which Khatehadourian makes his analysis. Since the doctrine of internal relations and each of the latter two theories is presupposed by most philosophers who hold the coherence theory of truth, the order of the exposition is designed to constitute a refutation in depth of the latter theory. The three chapters following contain "refutations" of coherence as the criteria of truth, coherence as the nature of truth, and the theory of degrees of truth, respectively. Following an exposition of the theory as set forth by Bradley, Bosanquet, and Blanshard, Khatchadourian devotes two chapters to the "refutation" of the doctrine of internal relations. The professed aim of the work is to discover the truth or falsity of the coherence theory of truth and thereby take the first step toward the more important task of answering the questions to which that theory is addressed (p. xi § 230.) This is a revision of a doctoral dissertation written at Duke University. Louct~ Claremont Graduate School The Coherence Theory o] Truth. It is not clear why anyone would pay the high price for this volume, all of which is hardly going to be of interest to any particular individual, and most of which consists of contributions containing ideas readily available in other forms. It is clear that the Festschri# idea has got out of hand. In sum: a string of papers, some good, many indifferent, on a variety of topics, some alive, some not, without the saving structure of a common theme. Hill's argument against the view that classical mechanics is a limiting case of quantum mechanics, and Yourgrau's dampening of an enthusiasm for a topological interpretation of elementary particle physics. Part III consists of papers about problems in physics, the most interesting of which seemed to me to be E. This section ends with a curiously discordant piece by Professor Veatch, claiming to show that Feigl's latest declarations about empiricism are quite compatible with the cosmological proof of God's existence, since all Feigl demands is a toehold in experience. Part II, on various problems in induction, empirical confirmation, and "method," includes many notables, Carnap and Popper among them, and much is heard of old positivist problems, including the crucial test, the verifiability principle, observational bases to knowledge, and so on. Except for Matson's lively, if inconclusive, dissolution of the problem, it is all pretty stale, including the attempts of psychologists Meehl and Stevens to scientize the problem and Bruce Aune's resurrection of epiphenomenalism without the credits. About half the contributions are devoted to the mind-body problem, offering various emendations to or criticisms of Feigl's neural identity theory. $9.75.) Another Festschri]t, this time to Feigl, drawing together philosophers from the logical empiricist and "analytical" camps (with a dissenter or two), a few psychologists, and one physicist. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966. AvRvm ST~LL University o] Cali]ornia, San Diego Mind, Matter and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor o] Herbert Feigl. What I have attempted to suggest is that this is a bold, radical, sweeping, unorthodox, and destructive account of the Tractatus, an4 that as such it must take its place among the major commentaries on Wittgenstein's early philosophical development. Both of these tasks would require a much longer review than space allows. I have also made no effort here to evaluate the quality of his work, or the plausibility of his main thesis. In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:īOOK REVIEWS 193 The foregoing account of Favrholdt's book does not bring out the wealth of detail it contains, nor does it adequately record the minuteness of the steps he takes when dealing with particular subjects in the Tractatus.
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